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PCAOB Inspection  Process: 
An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is charged with 
performing inspections of registered accounting firms.  (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Section 104)  Basically, inspections are to “assess the degree of 
compliance. . . with the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, 
or professional standards. 
 
The inspection process has many aspects.  Matters that have been discussed 
include timeliness of reports, extent of public disclosure of findings, qualifications 
of inspections, and the nature of the inspection process.  Only the last identified 
matter, the nature of the inspection process,  is the subject of this paper. 
 
After a review of the administrative structure for inspections, of the nature of the 
current inspection process, a tentative list of postulates is provided following by 
questions about the current process and a concluding summary.  
 
The review provides the following brief summary:   
 
1,  The current inspection strategy does not appear to reflect an assessment of 
the degree of compliance.    The process, as reflected in inspection reports, is 
that of a consulting engagement that has its purpose to aid the entity reviewed in 
understanding where deficiencies are serious.  The Board’s declaration that an 
inspection follows a “supervisory approach” seems related to consulting not 
compliance. 
 
2.  After more than five years of implementing the inspection process, the 
PCAOB has not established a clear, consistent model for inspections.  Therefore, 
no generalizations about audit performance can be provided. 
 
3.  An objective, comprehensive assessment of the process in relation to what 
was needed at the time of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
appears justified.    That assessment must go beyond the inspection process 
itself, however.  What is presented here is exploratory. 
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PCAOB Inspection  Process: 
An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified 
 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is charged with a 
continuing program of inspection of registered firms.  (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Section 104)   Basically, inspections are “to assess the degree of 
compliance. . . with this Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, 
or professional standards.”  Accounting firms undergo inspections yearly if  they 
provide  audit reports  “for more than 100 issuers and at least triennially if such 
firms  that provide audit reports for fewer issuers.”  
 
There are many aspects of the inspection task assigned to the PCAOB which 
have been subject to discussion and review.  Matters that have been discussed 
include timeliness of reports, extent of public disclosure of findings, qualifications 
of inspectors, and the nature of the inspection process.   It is the last topic only 
that is the subject of this paper. 
 
The following topics are discussed:   1.  PCAOB’s  administrative structure for 
inspections; 2.  Initial limited Inspections  3.  The nature and limitations of full 
scale Inspections; 4.  Perceptions of inspection process in the business press;   
5.  Postulates needed for framework of an inspection that determines 
compliance; 6..  Questions about the current inspection process; and 7. 
Summary.. 
 
1.  The PCAOB Administrative Structure for Inspections 
 
The PCAOB division responsible for administrating the inspection process is 
Registration and Inspections.  It is headed by a director who is supported by 
three deputy directors.   The Division’s expenditures for 2007 totaled $65.7 
Million (50.3 percent of total expenditures) compared to $63.0 Million in 2006 
(49.7 percent of total expenditures)  
 
As reported in the PCAOB 2007 Annual Report, there were 236 registered 
companies inspected.  Of these there were 10, including one Canadian firm, that 
audited 100 or more publicly-owned companies.  Of the 226 firms, 179 were  
U. S. firms, the other 47 were non U. S. firms located in 16 countries.  The 
PCAOB conducted 44 percent of the inspections from one of their offices, which 
are in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, Orange County, San 
Francisco, and Washington, D. C.    
 
The PCAOB annual reports note that Board’s inspection teams are experienced 
accountants.  Leaders of teams in 2007, for example, had an average of 23 
years of relevant experience and all other members of teams had an average of  
15 years of relevant experience.   
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2.  Initial Limited Inspections  
 
Initially, the PCAOB did not begin full scale inspections.  The Board during its 
initial year of functioning (2003) determined that limited inspection of the four 
largest U. S. firms would be undertaken.  The Board’s opinion was that such 
inspections were feasible and would serve the public interest and provide “an 
important foundation for full-scale inspections.”   (PCAOB, August 26, 2004, 
Release No. 104-2994-001)   The full-scale inspection process began in 2004. 
 
Attention to the Act’s Specifications 
 
The limited inspections included the three components that were identified in the 
Act for full-scale inspections: 
 
 a.  An inspection and review of selected audit and review engagements of  
the firm, performed at various offices and by various associated persons  
of the firm. 
 
b.  An evaluation of the sufficiency of the quality control system of the firm, 
and the manner of the documentation and communication of that system 
by the firm; and 
 
c.  Performance of such other testing of the audit, supervisory, and quality 
control procedures of the firm as are necessary or appropriate in light of 
the purpose of the inspection and the responsibility of the Board. 
 
The Process   
 
In each of the four limited inspections 16 audits were selected for review.  As 
would be the case for all inspections, the PCAOB inspection staff selected the 
audits to be reviewed and in no instance was the firm allowed “to limit or to 
influence the selection process.”    Additionally, the staff selected “certain subject 
matters for review, such as revenues, reserves or estimated liabilities, related 
party transactions, supervision of work performed by foreign affiliates, the 
assessment of risk by the audit team and journal entries and adjustments.” 
 
The limited inspections were completed for three of the four largest U. S. firms in 
the period from June 2003 to January 2004.  (The period was indicated as noted 
here.)  All four reports were issued on August 26, 2004.  There was no disclosure 
of how many inspectors were assigned to each or how many hours were spent 
during the periods indicated. 
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Reports Provided 
 
Reports of all four firms indicated deficiencies in audit performance.  All, for 
example, had failed to properly apply EITF 95-22.  In all firms there were issuers 
who had to restate their financial statements.  (There were 3 such restatements 
for the clients of two firms; 6 for clients of one firm and 8 for clients of one firm).  
The following statement (or one expressing the same thought) was included in 
each of the four reports:  “In addition, some of the audit engagements reviewed 
were found to involve some degree of departure from PCAOB standards or the 
firm’s own quality control policies or both.”  Such departures were not disclosed 
in the public reports of these limited inspections. 
 
Follow Up from Limited Inspections 
 
A press release from Nicolaisen, the Chief Accountant at the SEC, on the date of 
issuance of the report of the four registered audit firms  included the following: 
 
The goal of these reviews is to improve audit quality and thereby enhance 
financial reporting and the integrity of our markets.  Although the 
Commission was not involved in the preparation of the reports, based on 
my initial reading, the PCAOB’s process appears to be thorough and the 
reports are candid and transparent.  While I am disappointed with the 
findings of the reports, it is important to keep in mind that this is the first 
inspection which covers a period during which the firms were undergoing 
significant change following the July 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  The reports indicate that each of the four firms reviewed need 
to improve the quality of their audits.  (Nicolaisen, SEC Press Statement, 
August 26, 2004) 
 
On the date the four reports were issued, the PCAOB noted the nature of the 
inspection report process and the public availability of information in the reports.  
This report notes, though: 
 
The public portions of the inspection reports issued today include two 
general categories of information.  First, the reports include detailed 
descriptions of the types of matters on which the Board focused its 
inspection procedures, and the procedures the Board staff carried out to 
examine those matters.  Because these are the Board’s first reports, the 
Board is providing somewhat more detail about procedures than future 
reports will typically include.  (PCAOB, Press Release 104-2004-001) 
 
The report reflects the Board’s understanding of what is required to establish 
legally a violation of professional standards and notes: 
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. . . the Board is sensitive to the fact that a firm’s cooperation in 
constructively addressing an issue in a supervisory regulatory context is 
not the same thing as the firm admitting, for any legal purpose, a fact or a 
violation.  For these reasons, the Board emphasizes that an inspection 
report’s descriptions of departures from professional standards are not the 
result of an adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute 
conclusion finding of fact or of violations for purposes of imposing legal 
liability.  (PCAOB, Press Release 104-2004-001) 
 
Pursuant to Section 104 (g) (2) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, no portion of the 
limited reports dealing with criticisms of a firm’s quality control systems was 
made public.  (However, there had been a brief comment about this matter in the 
reports from the limited inspections, as noted earlier in this paper.)  Each firm 
knew that the Board would publicly disclose such criticisms if the firm failed to 
address them to the Board’s satisfaction within twelve months of the issuance of 
the report.  All four firms submitted reports concerning their efforts to deal with 
criticisms identified.  The Board issued a Release about the initial implementation 
of the process for addressing quality control.  The Board’s conclusion was:  “ [the 
firms] have crafted and undertaken important steps that, if consciously  
implemented, will have beneficial efforts on audit quality.”  (PCAOB Release 104-
2006-78)   That statement doesn’t quite declare that the problems were resolved.  
This ambiguous statement is disappointing inasmuch as it provides no clue to 
how easy or difficult it is to resolve quality control problems.    
 
Then, the Report continues with listings of “steps that emerged from the review 
process in which each of the four firms engaged as they responded to criticisms 
of their quality control systems.  There were seven categories identified.  To 
illustrate the nature of steps,  two items from the first two categories were:   
 
Audit performance: 
 
• changing the organizational structure so that responsibility for ethics, 
independence, client acceptance, and audit quality monitoring is 
separated from responsibility for audit operations and business 
development with a separate and direct reporting line to the firm 
Chairman, 
• adding a new requirement to include, in the audit documentation, evidence 
of engagement partner and manager involvement in, and review of, 
certain detailed work papers; (PCOB, Release 104-2006-78) 
 
Internal inspections: 
 
• increasing the number of engagements subject to internal inspection; 
• making changes to affect the internal perception of participation as a 
reviewer in the firm’s internal program by, for example, making clear 
that participation in the program is an indication that an individual is 
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viewed as a top performer and that it is an important developmental 
step in the career path of any senior manager who aspires to 
partnership, rather than being treated as a distraction from other 
responsibilities viewed as more important to advancement in the firm.  
(PCAOB, Release 104-2006-78) 
 
3.   The Nature and Limitations of Full Scale Inspections   
 
The PCAOB transformed the requirement of the Act to “determine compliance 
with relevant rules and regulations”  into a supervisory style of inspection with 
focus on self improvement.  Noted in the Board’s 2007 Annual Report is the 
following:: 
 
From the viewpoint of public investors, the most important features of the 
supervisory model are the effects the PCAOB’s program have on 
strengthening quality control and risk-management practices of registered 
firms and, in a broader sense, achieving more consistent compliance with 
applicable professional standards.  (PCAOB 2007 Annual Report)  
 
In earlier annual reports, the PCAOB, had underscored that the supervisory 
approach encourages firms to improve their practices and procedures. 
 
The Strategy for an Inspection 
 
Inspections are not identical from one firm to another.  There is no basis, 
therefore,  for determining the quality of audits performed by a single firm or all 
firms inspected in a year, therefore.   (Given the status of measurement of audit 
quality there is support for not providing a measure of quality at the firm level; 
however, it is not clear that a macro level assessment (of all firms for a year) 
could not be tentatively determined, at least for the Board’s consideration, if not 
sufficiently valid for public disclosure. 
 
As noted in the Board’s annual reports, inspections include only portions of 
selected audit engagements performed in the prior year by each registered firm 
undergoing an inspection.   Engagements, as well as portions of engagements, 
are selected for inspection primarily based on an assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement or significant audit deficiencies as well as other firm-
specific risks.   (PCAOB, 2007 Annual Report) 
 
 The focus is on aspects of the selected audits that are most likely to present 
“challenging issues.”  This risk-based approach is the result of cooperative efforts 
between the Division of Registration and Inspection and the Office of Research 
and Analysis. (2007 PCAOB Annual Report)   
 
During the process, while maintaining “a constructive, arms-length dialogue with 
the registered firm, identified deficiencies are discussed with the Firm’s staff 
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members related to the auditing process and/or to the particular audits under 
review.  
 
Each inspection has two components:  inspection of selected audit engagements 
and assessment of quality control factors that are considered critical in the 
consistent quality performance of audits.  Disclosure requirements for the two 
component differ, however. 
 
Disclosure in Inspection Reports 
 
A written report of the findings of an inspection is required.  However, as noted 
by one Board member, Niemeier:   “The reports are not designed or intended to 
rate firms according to a scorecard. . . .”  He later commented:     “The primary 
purpose of PCAOB reports is to further the dialogue between the Board and the 
firm about areas where the firm can improve its auditing.” (Niemeier) 
 
Complete disclosure of findings is not provided to the public  In an effort to 
protect what is perceived to be confidential and proprietary information, the 
Board may further limit disclosures, beyond those related to quality control 
systems. 
 
Deficiencies in Audits.  The findings related to deficiencies noted in the review of 
selected audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial 
reporting are included in the public portion of the inspection report.  The 
inspection team alerts the firm to the deficiencies during the inspection process 
and in those instances where the team’s judgment is that “those deficiencies that 
exceed a certain significance threshold are summarized without disclosure of the 
client.”  Such deficiencies are identified in the publicly issued report as related to 
Issuer A, Issuer B, etc. 
 
Each full-scale inspection report includes a statement about the meaning of 
deficiencies identified.  That statement generally includes: 
 
First, inclusion in an inspection report does not mean that the deficiency 
remained unaddressed after the inspection team brought it to the firm’s 
attention.  Under PCAOB standards, a firm must take appropriate action to 
assess the importance of the deficiency to the firm’s present ability to 
support its previously expressed audit opinions. . . A Board inspection 
does not typically include review of a firm’s actions to address deficiencies 
identified, but the Board expects the firms are attempting to take 
appropriate action.  (see initial pages of an inspection report or PCAOB 
Release No. 104-2007-001) 
 
Generalizations not Warranted.   The limitations for generalizing from reading a 
firm’s annual inspection report are noted in each report: 
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.  . . the Board cautions against drawing conclusion about the comparative 
merits of the annually inspected firms based on the number of reported 
deficiencies in any given year.  The total number of audits reviewed is a 
small portion of the total audit performed. . . and the frequency of 
deficiencies identified does not necessarily represent the frequency of 
deficiencies throughout the firm’s practice. . . . if the Board discovers a 
potential weakness during an inspection, the Board may revise its 
inspection plan to target additional audits . . . .(See any inspection report 
posted at the PCAOB website) 
 
Quality Control Findings.   There is explicit specification that 
 
 “ . . . no portions of the inspection report that deal with criticisms or 
potential defects in the quality control systems of the firm under inspection 
shall be public if such criticisms or defects are addressed by the firm, to 
the satisfaction of the Board, not later than twelve months after the date of 
the inspection report.  (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 104, (g) (2)) 
weakness and this may increase the number of deficiencies reported for 
that firm in that year.  (See any initial pages of an inspection report) 
 
Supervisory Context is Highlighted.   An inspection team is not performing a 
legally-driven engagement with a specified measurement of compliance.  
References to violations or potential violations of laws, rules, professional 
standards are to be understood in the supervisory context in which a report is 
prepared.  As noted in each inspection report: 
 
. . . any such references are not a result of an adversarial adjudicative 
process and do not constitute conclusive findings of fact or of violations for 
purposes of imposing legal liability.  Similarly, any description herein of a 
firm’s cooperation in addressing issues constructively should not be 
construed, and is not construed by the Board, as an admission, for 
purposes of potential legal liability, of any violation.  (See initial pages of 
an inspection report.) 
 
4.  Perceptions of the Inspection Process 
 
There is limited discussion of the effectiveness of the inspection process 
available at the PCAOB website or in professional accounting literature.  Among 
the references found through a Google search using the phrase PCAOB 
inspection process revealed a few relevant references.  A search of ABI-Inform, 
using the same phrase, resulted in 15 items, most were merely discussing the 
process; few provided any critical assessments. 
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The Overall Inspection Process 
 
In an article discussing William McDonough’s leadership style after he had left 
the PCOAB and had joined Merrill Lynch as vice chairman, there was reference 
to his experience in serving as the first chairman of PCAOB.  This comment was 
made: 
 
McDonough pushed forward, molding the PCAB to act more as an 
inspector than as an enforcer.  From his term at the Fed, which has 
certain regulatory responsibilities over banks, McDonough knew that it 
was important to get input from the auditors, learn their problems, win their 
trust.  His instincts told him that was the surest route to real reform.  Play 
bad cop and you’ll only drive them away. . .   
 
. . . McDonough hired 160 new PCAOB inspectors but only 20 
enforcement officers. . . McDonough’s approach worked.  The PCAOB 
was able to sit down with auditors and hammer out a set of workable 
standards that have since helped overhaul professional practice.  (Martin) 
 
 Concern  about the sufficiency of the process was discussed by an experienced 
auditor, McDonnell, who noted:   
 
The PCAOB made it clear the profession must regain the public’s 
confidence or face severe censure. But the board’s decision to use an 
inspection process to perform its oversight creates a high-risk environment 
for the profession. In a February 2004 speech at the Economic Club of 
Chicago, McDonough said the PCAOB inspection process would consist 
of reviews of audit engagements to ensure compliance with securities 
laws, the rules of the SEC and the PCAOB and the highest professional 
standards. 
Unfortunately, experience shows this approach provided little assurance   
of mitigating the risk of audit failure. Even though such reviews were an 
integral part of the internal quality control programs of audit firms for 
years, they weren’t very effective in preventing audit failures. Why would 
the PCAOB’s experience be any different? When I visited the PCAOB 
several months ago and posed that question to George H. Diacont, the 
PCAOB’s director of registration and inspections, he answered, “We’ll do it 
better.”  (McDonnell)  
A similar concern about the adequacy of the overall process was noted by Alles 
et. al. who noted: 
Given its ambitious agenda to extend inspections beyond the Big 4, the 
PCAOB should reflect on its experiences during both the 2004 and 2005 
inspection programs and evaluate its procedures.  For example, are the 
inspections structured so they will help restore the credibility of the audit 
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function?  More importantly, will the PCAOB’s inspection process uncover 
the underlying auditing and reporting problems that led to the creation of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?  Probably not.  (Alles, et al.) 
Ciesielski noted the extent of inspections implied in SEC Chairman Cox’s 
testimony in mid September (2006) by quoting Cox commenting about the SEC’s 
concern about audits being done without wasted time and effort: 
We anticipate that the SEC staff’s next inspection of the PCAOB will focus 
on the PCAOB’s own inspection program for registered audit firms.  In 
particular, the staff will likely focus on the PCAOB’s inspection of audits 
under PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2.  . . .we hope to achieve greater 
compliance with the Commission’s and the PCAOB’s own guidance that 
these be risk-based and cost-effective.  (Cox’s words as quoted in 
Ciesielski, The AAO Weblog) 
Ciesielski then noted: 
In short, carrying out the task of auditing public companies in accordance 
with the standards set by the PCAOB won’t be good enough – they have 
to be efficiently done as well.  Considering that the vast initial job of 
documenting control systems and getting them in order is now out of the 
way – at least, for firms above the $75 million market cap threshold – it’s 
reasonable to expect that auditors re moving along the learning curve.  
We’ll see when the PCAOB completes its inspections.  (Ciesielski) 
Results of Inspection 
Gullapalli, in a Wall Street Journal article reported, after talking with companies 
who had the results of their limited inspections, that: 
In general, the companies [interviewed for the article] dub the change 
superficial and say it didn’t have anything to do with their fundamentals. . ..  
Still however small the dollars in these particular instances may be, some 
accounting specialists see the accounting board’s close look at this 
relatively obscure rule [reference to requirement in Emerging Issues Task 
Force Issue No. 95-22:  “Balance Sheet Classification of Borrowings 
Outstanding under Revolving Credit Arrangements.”]  as a possible 
preview of more stringent rule enforcement in general.  (Gullapalli)   
Johnson noted that the “second round of official inspection reports related to the 
Big Four audit firms” led to a “handful of negative headlines” which may reflect 
the inadequacy of the shared information as well as the fact that the reports are 
for past periods and do not truly reflect how the audit firms are currently 
performing.  As Johnson stated: 
Using the terms “failed” and “failure” numerous times, the PCAOB cited 
the firms for basic accounting issues, some of which relate to lease and 
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tax accounting, revenue recognition, and goodwill-impairment testing.   All 
four of the reports, and the PCAOB’s previous evaluations of the Big 
Four’s work, noted that in some instances the firms did not “identify or 
appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of GAAP.”  
(Johnson, Why the Big Four are Still a Mystery) 
Leone noted that the 2005 inspections of two of the big four that were issued in 
early January 2007.  She commented: 
. . . one report identifies 10 companies for which audits were deficient, 
and says that in ‘some cases’ the errors appeared ‘likely to be material to 
the issuer’s financial statements.’  The other report identifies 11 deficient 
audits, and says that in ‘one case’ the result is likely to be material.  
(Leone)  
Leone noted that neither auditor changed any of its audit opinions as a result of 
the PCAOB report or the completion of further procedures. 
In responses to questions posed in an E-mail to Charles Niemeier, a 
PCAOB Board member, a “behind-the-scenes” look was provided.  In 
response, for example, to the question:  What do the 2005 inspections 
reports on the Big Four tell us about the audit firms?, Niemeier stated: 
 . . . they are intended to focus firms on the areas where they can improve. 
. . .  I feel comfortable saying the firms have come a long way in identifying 
and addressing risks to their audit quality, as a part of our inspections as 
well as on their own.  (Johnson, O&A:  The PCAOB’s Charles Niemeier) 
Disclosure Provided in Reports 
The position of the Board for maintaining confidential sections of the inspection 
report was stated clearly in the 2005 annual report noting the statutory limitation 
of disclosures related to a firm’s quality control system.  That requirement 
“reflects a legislative policy choice encouraging self-correction.”   Further 
comment included: 
The inspection report [the confidential portion, that is] encourages the firm 
to initiate a dialogue with the Board’s inspection staff about how the firm 
intends to address the criticism.  The Board provides the opportunity for 
dialogue so that a firm acting in good faith can receive timely feedback 
from the staff and enhance its efforts accordingly before the 12-month 
deadline.  (2005 PCAOB Annual Report) 
David Costello, CEO of the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, 
in an exclusive interview with The Practical Accountant, explained changes due 
to Sarbanes-Oxley.   He noted:  
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The principal mission of boards of accountancy is to protect the public 
through licensing qualified individuals and firms in the practice of 
accountancy, and providing quality assurance to the public through 
programs of continuing education, firm reviews, and when appropriate, 
enforcement of its rules and regulations. While the role of boards hasn't 
changed (i.e., its statutory mandate). SOX has indeed influenced the 
methodologies of boards. 
Most obvious is the public dissemination of the PCAOB's inspection 
reports. Boards are now made aware of deficiencies in audit performance 
earlier than under the previous firm-on-firm peer review process of the 
profession. Some boards are seeking more information about deficiencies 
in these inspection reports directly from their licensees.  (Anonymous)  
In an news article related to the issuance of the four limited audits issued on 
August 26, 2004, Weil noted: 
KPMG’s decision to voluntarily disclose the finding of potentially significant 
conflicts [the inspection had found that the accounting firm had accepted 
fees from independent-audit clients based on how much money it helped 
them save in taxes] highlights how shrouded in secrecy the new agency’s 
process will be.  The other three firms . . . .declined to specify what 
concerns, if any, the board raised about them in the confidential sections 
of their reports.  
Weil continued his discussion, noting:   
When Congress created the Board, it acceded to pressure by the Big Four 
firms to include a provision in the law under which the Board only would 
disclose the existence of deficiencies in a firm’s quality controls if the firm 
hadn’t fixed them within a year.  
Weil quoted Turner, the SEC’s chief accountant from 1998 to 2001 who stated: 
‘Congress needs to quickly bring that out into the sunshine.’  Weil also noted that 
the other three big firms declined to discuss the confidential sections of their 
reports.  One of the three assured Weil that they did not intend to depart from 
Congress’s process.  (Weil)  
5.  Postulates Needed to Guide Behavior of Inspectors 
While there is an explicit, straight-forward statement about the purpose of a 
continuing program of inspections, the implementation in the policies and 
practices of the PCAOB is not as clear.  Section 104 of the Act states, as noted 
earlier, that an inspection is to assess the degree of compliance . . .   
The implication from such a statement of purpose is that there are objective 
criteria for establishing compliance and that a process can be established that 
will provide assurance that a firm is performing audits in conformity with such 
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criteria.   Assumptions, that are accepted as postulates are needed to establish 
the framework to guide the behavior of inspectors.  A parallel to the postulates of 
auditing promulgated by Mautz and Sharaf (see their The Philosophy of Auditing, 
American Accounting Association, 1961) is needed.   
The following is a suggested tentative set of postulates for consideration: 
1.   An inspector undertaking an inspection of an audit firm is acting only as an 
inspector, who is a qualified, independent individual, whose integrity assures 
acceptance of responsibility to determine the extent to which the audit firm is 
adhering to the rules and standards specified. 
2  An inspection is an objective engagement for which relevant evidence is 
obtainable. 
3.  Evidence ranges from documentation maintained by the audit firm to evidence 
that confirms what is provided in the documentation, including, but not limited to  
observations, inquiries, and analyses of work completed. 
4.  The audit firm has an obligation to be cooperative, honest, and accepts  the 
value  of such an investigation. 
5.  The inspection team is able to determine the materiality of deficiencies 
disclosed during the inspection process and conclude its report with an objective 
judgment relative to materiality as the report is prepared. 
6.  The audit firm’s response to the draft of the report is to be carefully reviewed 
and judgments challenged are to be subjected to further review by another 
designated review group. 
7.  There shall be provided sufficient information about the inspection process 
and the findings that an interested reader has a clear understanding of both the 
process and the findings, taking into account information that is perceived to be 
best maintained confidentially. 
8.  The inspection process should be subjected to regular assessment for the 
purpose of determining changes needed to assure higher reliability for findings 
and improved methods that assure more timely reporting. 
9.  The information gathered from inspections related to quality control systems 
should be analytically studied for discovery of behavioral and administrative 
strategies that appear to result in high quality audits. 
10.   A persistent goal for inspections is to be the enhancement of audit quality to 
the extent that there is perceived to be credibility in the audit reports provided to 
audit clients. 
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None of these refers to the scope, nature, or extent of public disclosure.  Until a 
number of years of inspection results are subjected to empirical statistical 
analysis for validity and reliability there is no basis for disclosure of  findings for 
individual registered public accounting firms.  Public disclosure of a compliance 
score, for example, is not likely to be justified without such objective study.  An 
overall compliance report for a year’s audits could be disclosed publicly after the 
establishment of valid measurement strategies.     
6.  Questions for an Assessment of the Inspection Process 
The foregoing tentative postulates are inspired by what are perceived to be 
potential flaws in the current inspection process.  The following are merely 
questions raised as a result of problems identified or implied in comments that 
have appeared in inspection reports, conferences, newspapers, and in 
conversations. 
Is the role of an inspector confused? 
The Board takes “a supervisory approach to oversight and seeks through 
constructive dialogue to encourage firms to improve their practices and 
procedures.”  Is the inspector to be a counselor, a consultant?  Is there no 
awareness, as McDonnell noted (discussed earlier in this paper) that audit firms 
have had quality control systems for decades.  Yet, those systems were noted to 
be lacking in what many would call basic components of such systems such as 
appropriate segregation of duties of those responsible for monitoring ethics, 
independence, client acceptance, and audit quality from those responsible for 
audit operations.  Should an inspector assume that an audit firm has an 
understanding of quality control?   Is it possible to be both  an inspector and a 
consultant?   
Compliance implies  the need for objective and clear criteria.  Traditionally, 
auditors are only auditors when they  provide audits; they cannot at the same 
time be a consultant. 
 How objective is the current inspection process? 
 How independent is an inspector if there is a continuing dialogue with members  
 of  the audit firm?  The inspector must gain information from staff  and must  
 clarify the meaning of information provided.  Inspection team  members and    
 audit firm staff  meeting on a continuing basis about deficiencies identified may   
 undermine the objectivity of decision making on the part of the inspection team.  
 
How is objectivity safeguarded and assured in a supervisory environment? 
 
 How persuasive is the evidence  obtained? 
 
 There are often references to the documentation read during an inspection.     
  16 
 However, there is no information provided of additional evidence obtained to  
 provide corroboration of the documentation.   Is it sufficient, for example, to  read 
memoranda (or emails) that state clearly that there are to be no sign offs  on  
procedures that have not been completed as a basis for concluding that  such a 
practice is not tolerated in this firm? 
 
 Inspection reports fail to reflect sensitivity, for example, to the hierarchy of   
 employees in public accounting firms as well as other likely attitudes that  could    
 influence the nature of response of individuals.   For example, reports identify    
 focus groups that include more than one level of employees.  Seeking evidence 
of how the tone at the top is perceived by staff members at the staff auditor level 
when those staff auditors are included in the same group with seniors may fail to 
get candid opinions.    
 
Do inspectors get training in the art of asking questions, in observing, in 
assessing behavioral factors that are basic skills developed among sociologists 
and educators who undertaken field research studies and/or work with individuals 
and groups to gain understanding of  what is actually happening.  
       
How does the inspector inform the audit client of its role? 
There are often references to the “watchdog” role of the inspectors.  Public 
accounting firms have a long tradition of self-regulation.  They had had more than 
two decades of a peer review process under the auspices of the Public Oversight 
Board that was gentle and essentially worthless.  The imposition of a 
government-driven oversight process breaks with tradition.   The proper nature of 
oversight is, possibly, not yet devised.     
The failure of oversight was revealed in the extensive weaknesses in quality 
control noted by the PCAOB.  Yet, possibly, the positive conclusion of the first 
report related to quality control weaknesses was justified during this initial period.   
If such gentleness continues, the possibility of enhancing audit quality is likely not 
realized.  The statement in the PCAOB report doesn’t communicate clearly a 
level of satisfaction but merely states:  “the Board determined that the firm 
addressed the quality control criticisms to the Board’s satisfaction for purposes of 
Section 104 (g) (2) of the Act.”   (PCAOB, Observations on the Initial 
Implementation.) 
The reality of the need for more systematic, objective oversight must be 
communicated to audit firms.  Reasonable accountants who understand their 
public interest responsibilities will understand the need for credibility of audit 
reports.  
Another aspect of this question relates to the extent of public accounting 
responsibility.  In February 2008, the PCAOB proposed a new standard related to 
public accounting firms conducting internal evaluations.  In a brief article, 
Johnson noted:  that Scates of the PCAOB stated that:  The engagement quality 
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reviewers [of a registered firm] have a real potential to reduce after-the-fact audit 
failures.”  (Johnson, Auditor, Audit Thyself) 
What is the threshold for materiality? 
While a series of deficiencies in application of GAAP has value what does the 
series reflect when the audit as a whole is considered?  Somehow that question 
should lead to a general statement about materiality for an inspection report that 
can be communicated in the public portion of the report.  It is not sufficient for the 
Board to indicate that it is not a “score card.”  However, we live in a society 
where the sense of the whole is of great significance.  Just as the auditor must 
reflect an opinion about the financial statements taken as a whole, should not the 
inspector be able to reflect a judgment about the adequacy of the application of 
GAAP for the sample of audits inspected? 
At what point should an audit firm receive a draft of  a report?  
From information disclosed, there have been problems with the timely completion 
of an inspection report because of matters that were subject to challenge by the 
audit firm.  It is not clear who participates in resolving the challenges.  There is 
noted that it is the audit firm’s responsibility to determine whether or not a 
proposed change in the treatment of a transaction, for example, will be accepted.   
Is the process related to review of drafts optimum?  Should inspectors, if among 
themselves have varying opinions about the treatment of a transaction have 
access to some review group – possibly, inspectors not participating in the 
particular audit – to serve as a consultant?   The matter presented to such a 
group – or an outside group – can be presented in a manner that there is 
absolutely no disclosure of the audit firm or the audit firm’s client that is the 
subject of the unresolved matter. 
Why is the written report provided to the public vague? 
The initial limited audits resulted in reports that provided somewhat more 
information than was provided in the full-scale audits.  While the detailed strategy 
may indeed need to be maintained confidential, there should be sufficient 
disclosure that a reader has a macro sense of what is done during an inspection.  
The reports of the full-scale inspection omit all information related to quality 
control, because it is the judgment of the Board that confidentiality encourages 
self-correction.  This latter assumption may need to be explored empirically by 
noting the extent to which there is indeed self correction observed in subsequent 
inspections. 
How does the Board review the inspection process? 
There are delays in reporting, for example, that may be providing clues to 
problems with the current structure.  For example, the continuing interaction with 
the client may prolong the process.  Would it be more efficient to deal with 
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conflicts between the perceptions of the inspection team and the client through 
using a review group – from the inspection staff or an outside, competent group 
of people – to come to a judgment about which explanation – the team’s or the 
client’s -- is better? 
Is information being analyzed? 
The inspections provide a range of information heretofore not available for 
empirical study of what actually is the behavior – and outcome – of audit 
engagements.  Now, there is being gathered information that will contribute to 
understanding, for example firm characteristics, policies, and practices that 
enhance quality performance – and undermine such performance.  One of the 
valuable outcomes of the inspection process is the accumulation of information 
that may be of great value in learning what differentiates an office where effective 
audits are standard outcomes and where there are significant number of audits 
that are not effective.  For too long there has been the “black box” of uncertainty 
about external auditor behavior.  
Can the value of quality audits be internalized?  
External auditors, audit clients, and regulatory agencies must have a sustaining 
belief that a reasonable goal is that audits be consistently effective and do 
provide the reasonable assurance claimed in auditor reports. 
How genuine is the interest in maintaining high quality in the performance of 
audits?  A common statement in the letters from firms attached to the inspection 
reports is “Quality is our top priority and we are committed to continuously 
improving our audit quality.”  Is this statement made without impact on the reality 
of how audits are indeed performed?  As noted earlier, there is no general 
conclusion about the degree of effectiveness of the audits performed by the firm 
because of the nature of the process as explained by reports  provided by the 
PCAOB,  As an illustration of the difficulty of  interpreting statements that hint at 
quality, consider the language used in discussing the extent to which the firms 
responded to weaknesses in quality control:  
. . . the Board believes that those firms have crafted and undertaken 
important steps that, if conscientiously implemented, will have beneficial 
effects on audit quality.(PCAOAB Release 104-2006-078) 
Such a statement does not provide the reader with exactly what was the outcome 
of the quality control issues raised and for which the firms had to submit reports 
(Under Rule 4900 process) in response to the issue.    The wording of the 
PCAOB’s comment would lead a reader to believe that the firms are being 
required to undertake practices that are brand new.  Yet, quality control systems 
are not new; as noted earlier, professional guidance about quality control has 
been provided for decades.  Has the Board identified why prior guidance was 
seemingly ignored to a significant extent by public accounting firms? 
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7. Summary   
The discontent with the inspection process persists.  Much of the discontent has 
been deemed to be self-serving on the part of firms and issuers and seems not to 
be influencing behavior of the PCAOB.  
Such criticism deserves attention.  Furthermore, a comprehensive, objective 
review of the inspection process is justified.   The Act of 2002 targeted a woefully 
ineffective aspect of the self-regulatory strategies of the public accounting 
industry.  However, oversight that fails to meet its goal is not worthy of continuing 
support.  
The summary of this exploratory review is:  
1.  The Board continues to use the strategy established with the initial Board’s 
deliberations.  Does the Board plan to continue the current strategy which has 
now been used for more than five years?    Does  the current strategy reflect the 
need to begin with something less than a  compliance engagement because of 
the unanticipated problems encountered in attempting to assess compliance?     
Possibly, the need for reform is an evolutionary process and a long learning 
period is needed, notwithstanding that, in the case of public accounting, there 
has been long-term regulation and oversight . 
To date, it is not clear that the strategy is better than that provided by the Public 
Oversight Board, which persisted for more than two decades without achieving  
anticipated oversight success.   There was no objective review of POB, for 
example, after the first year or even the first five years.    
2.  The vague discussion of the actual inspection process established for a 
particular engagement does not provide sufficient information to judge the nature 
of the process.    
3.  The process has the tone of a consulting group that is attempting to be helpful 
to individuals who do not seem to know accounting principles or are uncertain 
about what is required for an audit engagement.  The tone is not clearly one that 
is objective and could lead to a reasonable conclusion that has meaning to all 
interested in audit quality for the population of audit firms registered.    
4.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reflected the need for a more reliable 
oversight process than one then in use. The PCAOB is a new oversight Board.  
Getting underway is not a simple task; it requires time.  However, inasmuch as 
oversight was not a new concept and there had been professional guidance for 
auditors to follow, it is not quite clear how much introductory time is needed to 
achieve an optimum and sufficiently rigorous oversight strategy to assure 
confidence in the opinions expressed by external auditors.    
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5.  The current inspections do not provide sufficient information about an 
assessment of auditor performance for the population of registered companies as 
a whole.  There has not been sufficient study of audit quality to give an inspected 
firm a rating.   
6.  Oversight credibility of the PCAOB is still an uncertainty.  Recent disclosures 
of inadequate internal controls, including risk management, have been noted in 
some major financial services organizations.   Yet,  such firms received 
unqualified opinions about their internal controls.   Were the weaknesses at a 
level below significance?        
7.  Is there not a need for an established framework for an inspection that 
determines compliance and includes postulates? 
8.   An objective, comprehensive assessment appears justified.  For example, the 
opinion of Neimeier that “ . . .I think both our inspections and firms’ own 
initiataives are driving improvements” may indeed be the reality.  Is it reality or 
merely a wish?  At this point, such an opinion needs to be transformed into an  
hypothesis for empirical investigation.    
 What is provided here is exploratory.  Nonetheless, tentatively there is support 
for an objective assessment.  That assessment must be comprehensive and go 
beyond the one topic included here, the inspection process.  The process, itself, 
was selected for discussion, since it appeared to be the core driver of what the 
Act of 2002 sought to achieve. 
9.  Beyond the inspection process, for example, there needs to be an answer to 
the question:  Is the current structure for oversight optimum?  Why isn’t oversight 
a direct, rather than a vague indirect, responsibility of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or of a newly constituted substitute for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission?  
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